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Abstract—Machine learning finds rich applications in Internet
of Things (IoT) networks such as information retrieval, traffic
management, spectrum sensing, and signal authentication. While
there is a surge of interest to understand the security issues of
machine learning, their implications have not been understood
yet for wireless applications such as those in IoT systems that
are susceptible to various attacks due the open and broadcast
nature of wireless communications. To support IoT systems with
heterogeneous devices of different priorities, we present new
techniques built upon adversarial machine learning and apply
them to three types of over-the-air (OTA) wireless attacks, namely
jamming, spectrum poisoning, and priority violation attacks. By
observing the spectrum, the adversary starts with an exploratory
attack to infer the channel access algorithm of an IoT transmitter
by building a deep neural network classifier that predicts the
transmission outcomes. Based on these prediction results, the
wireless attack continues to either jam data transmissions or
manipulate sensing results over the air (by transmitting during
the sensing phase) to fool the transmitter into making wrong
transmit decisions in the test phase (corresponding to an eva-
sion attack). When the IoT transmitter collects sensing results
as training data to retrain its channel access algorithm, the
adversary launches a causative attack to manipulate the input
data to the transmitter over the air. We show that these attacks
with different levels of energy consumption and stealthiness lead
to significant loss in throughput and success ratio in wireless
communications for IoT systems. Then we introduce a defense
mechanism that systematically increases the uncertainty of the
adversary at the inference stage and improves the performance.
Results provide new insights on how to attack and defend IoT
networks using deep learning.
Index Terms—Adversarial machine learning, IoT, wireless
communications, machine learning, deep learning, IoT security,
exploratory attack, causative attack, evasion attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has been successfully applied in diverse
areas such as image processing, natural language processing
(NLP), and autonomous driving. Emerging hardware resources
have increased the computing power and thus the amount
of training data that can be processed by machine learning
has grown significantly. In particular, deep learning that cor-
responds to training sophisticated structures of deep neural
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networks has achieved significant progress in improving the
decision making for various detection, classification, and pre-
diction tasks. Consequently, machine learning can make better
decisions such as recognizing human face, understanding
natural language (including social media that may not exactly
follow grammar rules), recognizing traffic signals for self-
driving cars, and beating professional gamers in traditional
games (e.g., Google’s AlphaGo [1]) and computer games [2].
Internet of Things (IoT) systems rely on various detection,
classification, and prediction tasks [3], [4] to learn from and
adapt to the underlying spectrum environment characterized
by heterogeneous devices, different priorities, channel, inter-
ference, and traffic effects. Machine learning has emerged as
a powerful tool to perform these tasks in an automated way
by learning from the complex patterns of the underlying wire-
less communication dynamics. Examples of machine learning
applied to wireless communications include modulation recog-
nition [5], spectrum sensing [6]–[8], interference management
[9], and routing [10]. IoT systems can benefit from cognitive
radio capabilities (potentially empowered by machine learn-
ing) for efficient use of limited spectrum resources available
to IoT applications [11].
Recently, there has been a surge of efforts to apply machine
learning to wireless security, including spoofing attacks [12],
jamming attacks on data transmission [13], [14], and other
attacks that target spectrum sensing [15] and signal classifi-
cation [16] tasks. In particular, IoT system security benefits
from machine learning to identify devices [17], [18], authen-
ticate signals [19], and detect anomalies [20]. With growing
applications of machine learning, it is necessary to understand
the underlying security threats that target machine learning
itself. Adversarial machine learning has emerged as a field
to systematically analyze the security implications of machine
learning in the presence of adversaries [21]–[23]. Traditionally
applied to data domains other than wireless communications,
various attacks studied by adversarial machine learning include
the following.
• Exploratory (or inference) attack where the adversary
aims to understand how the target machine learning
algorithm, e.g., a classifier, works [13], [24], [25].
• Evasion attack where the adversary aims to fool a ma-
chine learning algorithm into making wrong decisions
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[13], [26].
• Causative (or poisoning) attack where the adversary aims
to provide incorrect training data for a machine learning
algorithm to (re)train itself [27].
These attacks can be launched separately or combined, e.g.,
causative and evasion attacks can be launched building upon
the inference results of an exploratory attack [28]. These
attacks have been broadly applied against image and text
classifiers [29]–[31].
We present the application of adversarial machine learning
in IoT systems by mapping the techniques developed for
exploratory, evasion and causative attacks to different wireless
attacks, namely jamming, spectrum poisoning and priority
violation attacks in IoT networks. Adversarial deep learning
was applied in the test phase to jamming the data transmission
phase in [13], [14] and jamming the spectrum sensing phase
in [15]. In this paper, we use these attacks as benchmarks and
extend them to the (re)training phase to improve energy effi-
ciency and stealthiness of these attacks. We add the new attack
of priority violation built upon adversarial deep learning.
The main difference of these attacks from the conventional
wireless attacks (such as jamming, e.g., [32]–[34]) is that the
adversary directly targets the machine learning algorithm (such
as the one for spectrum sensing) used in IoT communications.
As the first step, the adversary senses the spectrum and infers
the transmission outcomes of an IoT device by monitoring
the presence of transmission acknowledgements (ACKs) over
the channel. One important difference between the traditional
use of adversarial machine learning (such as querying an
application programming interface (API) for computer vision)
and its wireless application is that a wireless adversary can
only partially observe the features (sensing result) and labels
(channel status) to train a classifier. Using these features and
labels (that may differ from those of the IoT transmitter due
to different channels), the adversary trains a classifier using
a deep neural network, as a form of an exploratory attack to
predict whether there will be a successful transmission at any
given time. The adversary uses this classifier to launch the
following attacks next.
• Jamming: If the adversary predicts that there will be
a successful transmission, it jams the data transmission
such that the receiver cannot decode the transmitted data.
• Spectrum poisoning: The adversary jams the sensing
phase with the goal of changing the features that describe
the current channel status and forcing the transmitter into
making wrong transmit decisions. Therefore, it can be
treated as an evasion attack. Note that this attack dif-
fers from the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF)
attack [35], since the adversary does not participate in co-
operative spectrum sensing and does not try to change the
estimated channel labels directly as in the SSDF attack.
Instead, the adversary injects adversarial perturbations
over the air to the channel.
• Violating priorities: The IoT transmitter with low priority
aims to avoid interference to IoT users with higher
priority. The adversary transmits during the sensing phase
by pretending to have higher priority. This attack forces
the transmitter into making wrong decisions and can be
treated as an evasion attack. It is similar to the primary
user emulation attack [36] that has not been studied yet
from the adversarial machine learning point of view.
Another difference of wireless attacks in IoT systems from
the conventional use of adversarial machine learning is that
a wireless adversary cannot directly manipulate the test or
training data input to a classifier but can only indirectly try to
do this by jamming the channel during the data transmission
or sensing phases. In all three wireless attack types, an IoT
transmitter may also retrain and improve its classifier with
additional training data collected. Then the adversary can
further launch an attack to change the transmission outcomes
(labels) or the channel status (features) to be used as part of the
input to the retraining process and thus reduce the transmitter’s
performance, which corresponds to a causative attack.
For all these wireless attacks, we demonstrate the success
of the unique techniques from adversarial machine learning
to infer the target classifier used for spectrum sensing and
transmit decisions, and manipulate its input in terms of test
and training data. Results clearly demonstrate the major per-
formance loss of IoT systems in terms of classification error,
throughput and success ratio for data offloading, and raise
the need to develop defense mechanisms against adversarial
machine learning. Thus, we design a defense approach, where
the IoT transmitter selectively makes some wrong actions
such that the exploratory attack cannot succeed. Consequently,
subsequent attacks cannot be successful either. A tradeoff for
this defense approach is on the number of defense actions. If
this number is small, there is only a limited impact on attacks
while if this number is large, the transmitter’s performance
drops even when there is no attack. We describe this problem
as a Stackelberg game and consider the defense for priority
violation attack as one example. Results show that with the
optimal number of defense actions, the throughput of the IoT
transmitter can be increased significantly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses related work. Section III presents the deep learning
model and overviews adversarial machine learning. Section IV
describes the IoT system setting to apply adversarial machine
learning. Section V, VI, and VII discuss the jamming, spec-
trum poisoning, and priority violation attacks, respectively.
Section VIII presents a defense approach against adversarial
machine learning. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Security issues for IoT systems have been widely studied in
the literature with machine learning applications, e.g., [17]–
[20]. In [17], a multi-stage meta classifier was trained by
machine learning to first distinguish between traffic generated
by IoT and non-IoT devices, and then determine IoT device
class. In [18], machine learning was used to automatically
identify the types of devices being connected to an IoT
network and enable enforcement of rules for constraining the
communications of vulnerable devices to minimize damage
resulting from their compromise. In [19], deep learning was
used to detect data injection and eavesdropping in IoT devices.
In [20], machine learning was applied within an IoT gateway
to detect anomalies in the data sent from the edge devices.
Adversarial machine leaning has started finding applications
in wireless communications. In [16], white-box and black-
box attacks were designed by changing the input data to a
modulation classifier based on deep learning. Our approach is
different as it targets data transmission and spectrum sensing
phases, and explicitly describes how to manipulate the input
data in test and training phases. Jamming attack and defense
mechanisms were developed in [13], [14] with deep learning,
while [15] studied a spectrum poisoning attack. In these
studies, retraining process was not considered. In this paper,
we provide a common adversarial machine learning framework
including both the jamming and spectrum poisoning attacks,
along with priority violation attacks, and extended the attack
space from test phase to (re)training phase for IoT systems.
Table I summarizes applications of adversarial machine learn-
ing to wireless security, where a ‘X’ mark indicates that the
corresponding problem is considered in a paper.
III. DEEP NEURAL NETWORK MODEL AND OVERVIEW OF
ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
A. Deep Neural Network Model
Machine learning makes decisions by learning from data,
without being explicitly programmed on how to make deci-
sions. Applications of machine learning can be categorized as
classification (if decisions are discrete values) or regression
(if decisions are continuous values). We focus on classifiers in
this article. A classifier can be built by using the training data
that has been labeled, where each sample in the training data
is described by a number of features and is associated with
a label (or class). Once trained, a classifier can determine a
label for any given unlabeled sample. The performance of a
classifier can be measured by the error of the determined labels
for some test data. Then an adversary can target the classifier
in terms of learning how the underlying algorithm functions or
manipulating training or test data to reduce its performance.
For a classification problem, each sample si is modeled by
a number of features (fi1, fi2, · · · , fiM ). Denote L(si) as the
actual label for sample si and C(si) as the label determined
by a classifier C. Ideally, a perfect classifier should always
produce C(si) = L(si). In reality, a classifier may not always
make the correct decision, i.e., it may produce C(si) 6= L(si)
for some sample si. We can use a set of test data to measure
the performance of a classifier. Suppose that the size of test
data is ntest and the number of samples with C(si) 6= L(si)
is nerror. Then the error probability is calculated as nerrorntest .
There are various machine learning algorithms such as
Naive Bayes, support vector machine, neural networks and
deep learning, to train a classifier. We apply deep learning
at both the transmitter and the adversary to capture the
complex interactions of channel, traffic, and actions of the IoT
transmitter and the adversary. Deep learning extends neural
networks with more hidden layers in addition to the input and
output layers. In this paper, we consider a feedforward neural
network (FNN). Each layer consists of neurons. The neurons
in the input layer accept features of a sample si as inputs.
Each neuron processes its input data by an activation function
and provides its output to neurons in the next layer. Neurons
in the output layer provides various outputs, including label
C(si) for sample si and a score that measures the confidence
of classification. The mathematical function at each neuron
is not predetermined and consists of weights and biases. A
number of training data samples is used to train the deep neural
network, i.e., optimally determine its weights and biases such
that the output labels are close to the real labels. Details of
the deep neural networks are discussed in Section IV.
B. Overview of Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial machine learning has been studied for different
data domains mostly focused on image and text processing
[23]. In this paper, we consider an IoT transmitter T using
its pre-trained classifier C to detect idle channels for data
transmissions. The adversary A applies the following three
types of attacks (see Figure 1) on the target classifier C.
• Exploratory attack. The adversary aims to build a classi-
fier Cˆ similar to the target classifier C. That is, for most
samples, we have Cˆ(si) = C(si). Such an attack can
be a white-box attack, where the adversary knows the
classifier algorithm and/or training data, or a black-box
attack, where the adversary does not have any knowledge
on the classifier algorithm or training data. We will focus
on a black-box attack in this paper.
• Evasion attack. The adversary aims to determine the data
samples that are most likely to be misclassified by the
target classifier. One example of such attack is that an
adversary wants to generate spam emails that cannot be
identified as spam.
• Causative attack. If the original classifier is trained with
limited data, it may be retrained with additional training
data. However, the adversary can attack this retraining
process by providing incorrect training data.
These attacks can be applied separately or jointly. We will
describe their application of these attacks in wireless commu-
nications for an IoT network in Section IV.
IV. ADVERSARIAL DEEP LEARNING FOR WIRELESS
ATTACKS
There are important differences between the traditional use
of adversarial machine learning (such as querying a computer
vision API) and its application in wireless communications.
• In the wireless setting, the adversary cannot query a
transmitter’s classifier directly with an input sample and
receive its label output. Instead, the adversary can only
observe the transmitter’s behavior over a channel, i.e.,
the adversary can only obtain noisy samples of input
data that may be different from what the transmitter
observes due to different channel and interference ef-
fects. Moreover, the adversary predicts the outcome of
TABLE I
ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING ATTACKS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS.
Attack Attack in test phase Attack in (re)training phase
Jamming Spectrum poisoning Priority violation Jamming Spectrum poisoning Priority violation
[13], [14] X — — — — —
[15] — X — — — —
This paper X X X X X X
𝐴 𝐶
Data
Labels
• 𝐴 queries 𝐶 with data samples D.
• 𝐶 returns labels L.
• 𝐴 trains classifier መ𝐶 with (D, L). 
𝐴 𝐶
Data
Labels
• 𝐴 queries 𝐶 with selected data samples D.
• 𝐶 returns wrong labels 𝐿.
𝐴 𝐶
Data, Labels
Retraining
• 𝐴 provides 𝐶 with wrongly labeled data 
samples.
Exploratory 
(inference) 
attack
Evasion
attack
Causative 
(poisoning) 
attack
Fig. 1. Types of attacks under adversarial machine learning.
transmissions (‘ACK’ or ‘no ACK’) while the transmitter
predicts channel status (‘idle’ or ‘busy’). Hence, the
labels of their classifiers will also differ.
• In the wireless setting, the adversary cannot directly
manipulate the test or training data input to a classifier
(such as selecting the exact input data to the classifier
or flipping training data labels in the training process).
Instead, the adversary can only decide on how to make
transmissions that manipulate the received signals so that
the test or training process is indirectly fooled.
To provide insights into the application of adversarial
machine learning to wireless communications, we consider
the following setting. A machine learning-based classifier
(namely, a deep neural network) is used at an IoT transmitter
T to analyze the spectrum sensing data and identify idle
channels for data transmission. Packets arrive at a background
transmitter B randomly according to the Bernoulli process
with rate λ = 0.8 (packet/slot). Whenever B is idle and it has
packet(s) to transmit, it is activated with certain probability
to continue transmitting until it empties its queue. Therefore,
it is possible that a continuous period of slots remains busy
depending on the number of previous idle slots. As a result,
there is a temporal correlation among channel busy/idle states
and therefore it is necessary for both T and A to observe the
past channel status over a time period to predict the current
channel status. To simplify the discussion, we assume a single
background transmitter (potentially, another IoT transmitter
with higher priority). For the general case of multiple back-
ground transmitters, channel busy/idle status is determined by
the aggregated signals from all these transmitters. This setting
does not affect the attack/defense approaches developed in the
paper.
T uses a time slot structure with three phases, the sensing
phase, the transmission phase, and the feedback phase. T
collects channel status during the sensing phase and then
applies a machine learning algorithm to predict whether the
channel is busy or idle. In this paper, we assume that T applies
a deep neural network. If the channel is predicted as idle, T
transmits its data during the transmission phase. The receiver
R sends ACK in the feedback phase if data is received. T
optimizes the hyperparameters of its deep neural network (e.g.,
number of layers) by solving the optimization problem HyperT
that minimizes max{e
MD
(C), e
FA
(C)}, where e
MD
(C) is the
misdetection probability of classifier C that a busy slot is
classified as idle and and e
FA
(C) is the false alarm probability
of C that an idle slot is classified as busy.
We end up with the following structure of deep neural
network implemented with TensorFlow. FNN is trained with
the backpropagation algorithm by using the cross-entropy as
the loss function. Number of hidden layers is 3. Number of
neurons per hidden layer is 100. Rectified linear unit (ReLU)
is used as activation function at hidden layers. ReLU performs
the f(x) = max(0, x) operation on input x. Softmax is used as
the activation function at the output layer. Softmax determines
the ith entry of f(x) by performing f(x)i = exi/
∑
j e
xj on
input x. Batch size is 100. Number of training steps is 1000.
The adversary A performs a black-box exploratory attack to
predict the outcome (ACK or not) of transmissions. Without
knowing the classifier of T , A senses the channel status,
monitors ACKs (labels) over certain period of time and using
the collected data to train another classifier. Note that the
adversary needs to detect the presence of an ACK but does
not need to decode its message. ACK messages have certain
features that make it easier for the adversary to distinguish
them from data messages. First, ACK messages are shorter.
Second, they follow a data transmission. Third, the signal-to-
noise-ratio (SNR) to decode them is much smaller than that
for data messages. Consequently, A can reliably detect if there
is an ACK message transmission that is distinct from a data
transmission. Furthermore, by observing inter-arrival times of
ACKs, A can determine T ’s time slot structure including start
and end point, duration and its decomposition to sensing,
transmission, and feedback periods.
The optimization problem at adversary A is similar to
Jamming
attack
Spectrum 
data 
falsification 
attack
Priority 
violation 
attack 
𝐴
𝑇 𝑅
• 𝐴 senses the channel between 𝑇 and 𝑅, 
and jams it if it is busy.
𝐴
𝑇 𝑅
• 𝐴 provides the classifier at 𝑇 with wrong 
sensing data (i.e., reports idle if the 
channel is busy, and vice versa).
𝐵
𝐴
𝑇 𝑅
• 𝐴 acts as if it has a higher priority and 
claims the channel by transmitting. 
Fig. 2. Types of attacks on wireless communications.
Problem HyperT and thus is omitted.
After the exploratory attack, A analyzes the channel access
behavior of T and launches further attacks. We consider three
types of attacks on wireless communications, as illustrated in
Figure 2, by using results from the exploratory attack.
• Jamming attack: In a typical jamming attack, the ad-
versary transmits if it predicts a transmission and if
there is indeed a transmission, the adversary jams this
transmission. The jamming attack in this paper is dif-
ferent. A does not predict whether the channel is idle
(and there will be a transmission attempt) and jam all
transmissions. Instead, it predicts and jams successful
transmissions only, which is more energy efficient than
typical jamming attacks. Moreover, T may retrain its
classifier based on the feedback from R. In this case, A
can jam transmissions to change the input training data
such that the updated classifier actually becomes worse,
which corresponds to a causative attack.
• Spectrum Poisoning Attack: A jams the sensing phase.
By doing so, the features to describe the current channel
status are changed and thus the decision made by machine
learning may also be changed, which corresponds to an
evasion attack. A transmits during the sensing phase to
inject adversarial perturbations to the channel. The goal
of A is to fool T ’s classifier into making wrong transmit
decisions. That is, T may transmit in a busy channel or
may not transmit in an idle channel, which reduces the
communication performance. Again, T may retrain its
classifier and A can manipulate features in the retraining
process. By using the manipulated features to retrain
a classifier, T ’s performance may actually drop, which
corresponds to a causative attack.
• Priority Violation Attack: There is the background traffic
Exploratory 
(inference) 
attack
Evasion
attack
Causative 
(poisoning) 
attack
• 𝑇 receives 𝐷 = ℎ𝐵𝑇 𝑥𝐵 + 𝑛𝑇 from 𝐵 (transmitting 𝑥𝐵) and 
makes label L (idle or busy) depending on channel occupancy.
• 𝑇 trains classifier 𝐶 with (𝐷, 𝐿).
• 𝑇 transmits 𝑥𝑇 to 𝑅
if 𝐶 𝐷 = idle
𝐴
𝑇 𝑅
𝐵
• 𝐴 overhears data 𝐷 = ℎ𝐵𝐴 𝑥𝐵 +
ℎ𝑇𝐴𝑥𝑇 + 𝑛𝐴 from 𝐵 and 𝑇, and 
labels L (ACK or not) from 𝑅. 
• 𝐴 trains classifier መ𝐶 with (𝐷, 𝐿). 
xB 𝐿hBT
hBA
𝐴
𝑇 𝑅
𝐵xB 𝐿hBT
hBA
• 𝑇 runs test data 𝐷 = ℎ𝐵𝑇 𝑥𝐵 + 𝑛𝑇 from 𝐵 with the trained 
classifier to make a transmission decision.
• 𝐴 transmits and changes test data of 𝑇 from ℎ𝐵𝑇 𝑥𝐵 + 𝑛𝑇 to 
ℎ𝐵𝑇 𝑥𝐵 + ℎ𝐴𝑇 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑛𝑇 over the air and 𝑇 makes wrong decision. 
xA
hTA
𝐴
𝑇 𝑅
𝐵xB 𝐿hBT
hBA
• 𝑇 retrains its classifier 𝐶 with training data 𝐷 = ℎ𝐵𝑇 𝑥𝐵 + 𝑛𝑇
from 𝐵 and labels from 𝑅.
• 𝐴 transmits and changes labels at 𝑅 as well as training data of 𝑇
from ℎ𝐵𝑇 𝑥𝐵 + 𝑛𝑇 to ℎ𝐵𝑇 𝑥𝐵 + ℎ𝐴𝑇 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑛𝑇 over the air (if its 
transmits during sensing period).
• 𝑇 retrains its classifier 𝐶 with wrong labels and data samples. 
xA
hTA
𝐶
Fig. 3. Adversarial machine learning in wireless communications.
from a user with higher priority that follows a certain
pattern. Once a transmission from a high-priority user
is detected, the transmitter with lower priority backs
off for several time slots to avoid interference to such
transmissions. A again jams the sensing phase, but now
its objective is to pretend to be a user with high priority.
Due to the backoff mechanism, A can reduce the number
of attacks and thus consume less energy than the spec-
trum poisoning attack. When T retrains its classifier, A
increases (false) high-priority user activities in the input
to the retraining process as a form of causative attack.
Figure 3 summarizes the unique properties when adversarial
machine learning is applied in wireless communications for an
IoT network. Note that for causative attack, A can identify T ’s
re-training phase when re-training is launched periodically. A
first determines the end time of re-training phase by observing
the accuracy changes due to updated T . Then A further
determines the length of re-training phase by adjusting the
length of its causative attack periods. In the following sections,
we will visit each type of wireless attack and show how to
apply adversarial machine learning.
V. JAMMING ATTACK
Adversarial deep learning to jam the test phase of data
transmission was considered in [13], [14]. We first use this
attack as a benchmark and then extend this attack to the
(re)training phase to improve energy efficiency and stealthiness
of the attack.
We consider the scenario that an IoT transmitter T senses
the channel status (‘idle’ or ‘busy’) and transmits when
TABLE II
JAMMING ATTACK BASED ON ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING.
Attack False alarm Misdetection Normalized throughput Success ratio
No attack 2.68% 1.03% 96.43% 95.58%
Jamming attack 22.69% 70.25% 22.70% 23.12%
Jamming attack on retraining 53.10% 31.96% 46.40% 85.00%
channel is sensed as idle. The sensing result is either noise
plus interference if channel is busy or noise if channel is
idle. We assume that noise n
T
at T follows the Gaussian
distribution. Interference is from some transmitter B (unknown
to T ). Denote transmit power as PB and channel gain from
B to T as h
BT
. Then we have the mean interference power
as h
BT
PB . We assume that interference follows the Gaussian
distribution. T applies deep learning to build a classifier C that
uses the most recent nnew channel sensing results to determine
the channel status (‘idle’ or ‘busy’). If channel is idle in a time
slot, T transmits data with power PT and receives feedback
ACK (if data is received by receiver R). R can receive data
if the SINR at R is not less than a threshold β.
There is an adversary A that launches a jamming attack in
three steps. In the first step, A senses channel (noise plus
interference or noise) and the transmission outcome (ACK
or not) over a period of time. The collected data is used as
training data to build a classifier Cˆ in the second step (by using
nnew most recent sensing results aggregated for each data
sample). This corresponds to an exploratory attack. However,
there are some subtle differences from the conventional use of
exploratory attack discussed in Section III:
• The features are different. Note that the power levels
sensed at T and A are usually different due to random
channel effects. Thus the features (most recent nnew
sensing results) are different at T and A.
• The labels are different. T aims to predict whether a
channel is idle or busy. A cannot directly query the
classifier and obtain labels. Instead, A obtains labels in
terms of overheard feedbacks and aims to predict whether
there is a successful transmission.
Due to these differences, the classifier Cˆ may not be similar
to C. Instead, Cˆ will predict the outcome of actions based
on C using the sensing data at A. In the third stage, A starts
jamming with power PA if it predicts that T will transmit
and this transmission will be successful. With the additional
interference from A, a transmission may fail (once the SINR
at R is less than threshold β).
The locations of B, T , R, and A are (0, 15), (−10, 0),
(0, 0), and (10, 0), respectively. Channel gain h is modeled
as h = d−2, where d is the distance between two nodes. We
assume that the mean noise power is normalized as 1. The
(normalized) powers at B, T , R, and A are PB = PT =
PA = 1000. The SINR threshold is β = 3. The classifier C is
built on 1000 training data samples (see optimization problem
HyperT in Section III) and applied on 500 test data samples.
nnew = 10 most recent sensing results are aggregated as one
input sample. The false alarm (idle channel is determined
as busy) and misdetection (busy channel is determined as
idle) probabilities are measured as e
FA
(C) = 2.68% and
e
MD
(C) = 1.03%, respectively. The achieved throughput
is normalized by the ideal throughput (every idle channel
is detected for transmission). The normalized throughput is
measured as 96.43%. In addition, the success probability of
attempted transmissions is measured as 95.58%. These results
show that C is built with high accuracy and achieves near-
optimal performance when there is no attack present.
To launch a jamming attack, A builds classifier Cˆ based on
1000 observations on the outcome of T ’s actions by solving a
similar optimization as HyperT in Section III and applies Cˆ on
the same 500 test data samples (where nnew = 10 most recent
sensing results are aggregated as one input sample). We find
that this attack significantly jams many transmissions and then
decreases the performance of T . In particular, the normalized
throughput is reduced to 22.70% and the success probability
is reduced to 23.12%.
Moreover, T may update its decision strategy based on
feedback (ACK or not) in the retraining process. That is, if
there is an ACK, T labels the current time slot as idle and if
there is no ACK for a transmission, T labels the current time
slot as busy. It is expected that T can improve its classifier C
by retraining C with additional data. However, A can launch
an attack by determining when to jam such that some labels
are incorrect. As a result, the updated classifier for T may
become worse, i.e., it may make more wrong decisions than
T ’s current classifier. This corresponds to a causative attack.
Suppose that classifier C is updated by additional 1000
training data samples under such an attack. We find that
the performance of the updated classifier drops. Under this
attack, the classifier C is updated as C˜. The false alarm
and misdetection probabilities are e
FA
(C˜) = 53.10% and
e
MD
(C˜) = 31.96%, respectively. The normalized throughput
is 46.40% and the success probability is 85.00%. Note that
the attack on retraining process is confined to the training
period, which is typically much shorter than the test period,
and therefore such an attack is more energy-efficient and
stealthier than attacking the test phase as discussed before.
Table II summarizes results for jamming attacks in both test
and training periods.
VI. SPECTRUM POISONING ATTACK
Adversarial deep learning to jam the test phase of spectrum
sensing was considered in [15]. We first use this attack as a
benchmark and then extend this attack to the (re)training phase
to improve energy efficiency and stealthiness of the attack.
In the jamming attack, A jams the data transmission phase.
In the spectrum poisoning attack, A makes transmissions to
change sensing results in the sensing phase (see Figure 4),
TABLE III
SPECTRUM POISONING ATTACK BASED ON ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING.
Attack False alarm Misdetection Normalized throughput Success ratio
No attack 2.68% 1.03% 96.43% 95.58%
Poisoning attack 91.96% 1.29% 8.04% 64.29%
Poisoning attack on retraining 65.18% 29.64% 46.43% 33.77%
spectrum 
sensing
data
transmission
jamming attack
1. spectrum poisoning attack
2. priority violation attack
feedback
ACK
one time slot
Fig. 4. Attacks on different phases.
which are the features used by T , and thus mislead the
machine learning algorithm of T by providing wrong features.
Hence, T makes a wrong decision, i.e., does not transmit when
the channel is idle or transmits when the channel is busy. This
corresponds to an evasion attack.
We consider the same network setting as in Section V.
Without an attack, the false alarm and misdetection proba-
bilities of classifier C are measured as e
FA
(C) = 2.68%
and e
MD
(C) = 1.03%, respectively. Using C to make trans-
mission decisions, the normalized throughput and the success
probability are measured as 96.43% and 95.58%, respectively.
Under this attack, the input to C is modified by A and
thus the false alarm and misdetection probabilities change
to e
FA
(C) = 91.96% and e
MD
(C) = 1.29%, respectively.
The normalized throughput is reduced to 8.04% and the
success probability is reduced to 64.29%. Note that the sensing
phase is much shorter than the transmission phase. Thus, the
spectrum poisoning attack consumes much less energy than
the jamming attack, e.g., if the length of data transmission is
9 times of the length of spectrum sensing, spectrum poisoning
attack can save energy by 88.89% while the reduction in
normalized throughput of T increases by 15% compared to
jamming attack.
A can also provide wrong features in the retraining process.
Under such an attack, the classifier C is incorrectly updated
as C˜. The false alarm and misdetection probabilities are
e
FA
(C˜) = 65.18% and e
MD
(C˜) = 29.64%, respectively. The
normalized throughput is reduced to 46.43% and the success
probability is reduced to 33.77%. Table III summarizes results
for spectrum poisoning attack in test and retraining phases.
VII. PRIORITY VIOLATION ATTACK
We consider the scenario that the unknown transmitter B
is a high-priority, potentially an IoT, user. T needs to predict
the existence of high-priority user’s transmission by machine
learning and avoid transmitting at the same time. We assume
that the high-priority user transmits in a time frame with
probability 0.2 and such a transmission takes 5 time slots.
Once a high-priority transmission is detected, T will back off
for 2 time slots. We implement this scenario using the same
network setting in Section V. Due to different background
traffic, T needs to train its classifier C and achieves a different
performance. The false alarm and misdetection probabilities of
C are e
FA
(C) = 19.62% and e
MD
(C) = 0.83%, respectively.
The normalized throughput is measured as 79.62% and the
success probability is measured as 98.10%. Note that the false
alarm probability is larger than that in Section V or VI, which
is the cost to protect high-priority transmissions. This also
causes a smaller throughput.
An adversary A learns the outcome of T ’s transmissions by
deep learning (exploratory attack) and tries to behave like a
high-priority user (e.g., replay the high-priority user’s signal in
the sensing phase) when it predicts a successful transmission
of T . This attack is again on the sensing phase (see Figure 4).
Moreover, due to the backoff mechanism, there is no need
to replay the high-priority user’s signal in every time slot.
Compared to spectrum poisoning attack, which is an energy
efficient attack, we observe that the number of attack actions
can be reduced by 46.20%, which corresponds to further
reduction on energy consumption. Under this attack, the input
to C is changed. Then the false alarm and misdetection
probabilities are e
FA
(C) = 88.08% and e
MD
(C) = 0.42%,
respectively. The normalized throughput is reduced to 11.92%.
The success probability is 96.88% since only few transmission
attempts are made and those are still mostly successful.
When T retrains its classifier, A provides wrong features
in the retraining process. Under this attack, the false alarm
and misdetection probabilities are e
FA
(C˜) = 26.54% and
e
MD
(C˜) = 14.17%, respectively. The normalized throughput
is 74.23% and the success probability is 85.78%. This attack
is not very successful (the normalized throughput is reduced
from 79.62% to 74.23% and the success probability is reduced
from 99.05% to 85.78%) since the number of attack actions is
reduced and thus has a limited impact in the retraining process.
Table IV summarizes results for the priority violation attack.
VIII. DEFENSE APPROACH TO ADVERSARIAL MACHINE
LEARNING FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
The results under the three attack scenarios shown in
Tables II, III, and IV demonstrate the success of adversarial
machine learning in wireless communications and raise the
need of developing effective defense approaches to protect
machine learning-based IoT systems.
Exploratory attack is the basis of subsequent evasion and
causative attacks. The data collected by A for the exploratory
attack includes features and labels. T cannot change features
TABLE IV
PRIORITY VIOLATION ATTACKS BASED ON ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING.
Attack False alarm Misdetection Normalized throughput Success ratio
No attack 19.62% 0.83% 79.62% 98.10%
Priority violation attack 88.08% 0.42% 11.92% 96.88%
Priority violation attack on retraining 26.54% 14.17% 74.23% 85.78%
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Fig. 5. The defense procedure.
(sensing results) but can change labels by taking different
transmit actions. One approach is randomizing the deep learn-
ing network by adding small variations to output labels such
that transmit actions can be changed, e.g., transmit in a busy
channel or not transmit in an idle channel. By taking these
different (wrong) transmit actions, T aims to fool A and
prevents it from building a good classifier Cˆ in the exploratory
attack that is used to predict the outcome of T ’s transmissions.
There is a tradeoff in this defense scheme, i.e., taking many
different actions reduces the performance of T although it
provides a better protection against the attacks. Thus, it is
important for T to tune the level of controlled variations added
to decisions such that the performance drop of T is limited
while the protection against the attacks is still significant.
The above approach, although simple, has a drawback
that we cannot selectively make wrong actions to maximize
the protection effect. In this paper, we consider a better
approach by noting that deep learning classifier C provides
a score to characterize the confidence on classification. Thus,
to maximize the impact of defense actions, wrong actions
should be taken when the confidence is high. In particular, the
score S(si) is compared with threshold τ for classification,
i.e., si is classified as label 0 if S(si) ≤ τ and as label 1
otherwise. If a sample has a score close to τ , the confidence of
classification is low, otherwise the confidence is high. Based on
the classification score in the training data, we first determine
two thresholds τ0 and τ1 such that τ0 < τ < τ1 and there are
50% samples with label 0 and S(si) ≤ τ0 and 50% samples
with label 1 and S(si) ≥ τ1. Then a sample is regarded to have
high classification confidence if S(si) ≤ τ0 or S(si) ≥ τ1.
In this defense, we consider a tradeoff on the number of
wrong actions and the level of protection against the attacks.
Transmitter T selects the probability of defense actions pd, i.e.,
for each sample with high confidence, T may take a defense
action with probability pd. We can denote the revised classifier
of T as Cpd . Adversary A then optimizes its deep learning
Fig. 6. Defense probability pd and achieved normalized throughput (both
measured in %) during the search process.
classifier Cˆpd to predict transmission outcomes. A launches an
attack using Cˆpd and under this attack, T applies classifier Cpd
and achieves certain performance, e.g., normalized throughput.
By observing this performance, T adapts pd to improve its
performance. This procedure is shown in Figure 5. This is a
Stackelberg game, where T is the leader and A is the follower.
In this game, T aims to maximize the normalized throughput
V ∗(pd) by optimizing pd while A aims to minimize the nor-
malized throughput V (pd, H) for given pd by optimizing deep
learning parameters H , where V ∗(pd) = minH V (pd, H).
This optimization problem can be formulated as
DefenseT: maximize min
H
V (pd, H)
subject to V (pd, H) = R(Cpd , Cˆpd(H))
variable: pd,
where Cˆpd(H) is A’s classifier with hyperparameter H
when T takes defense actions with probability pd and
R(Cpd , Cˆpd(H)) is the reward function that measures nor-
malized throughput under classifiers Cpd and Cˆpd(H).
DefenseT targets the exploratory attack and does not depend
on the nature of subsequent attacks. In particular, this defense
was applied against jamming attacks in [13], [14]. In this
paper, we demonstrate the performance of DefenseT against
the priority violation attack and show that it is effective
against a broad range of attacks. Without the defense, the
throughput is 11.92% (see Table IV). Since the optimization
process at A is unknown to T , T will search for optimal
pd with smaller step size in each round. In the first round,
T takes step size 5% and tries different levels of defense,
i.e., pd = 5%, 10%, · · · , 25%. The achieved throughputs
are 24.62%, 21.54%, 23.85%, 29.23%, and 25.39%, respec-
tively. Since pd = 20% yields the largest throughput, T
will further search the region around 40% using a smaller
step size 1% in the second round. That is, T takes pd =
17%, 18%, 19%, 21%, 22%, and 23%. The achieved through-
puts are 30.38%, 25%, 26.54%, 26.15%, 32.31%, and 25.77%,
respectively. Since pd = 22% yields the largest throughput, T
will use pd = 22% as the final solution. The defense increases
throughput from 11.92% to 32.31%. Figure 6 shows pd value
and normalized throughput over iterations.
IX. CONCLUSION
We developed adversarial machine learning techniques to
attack and defend IoT systems. We considered an IoT network,
where an IoT transmitter senses channel and applies deep
learning to predict the channel status (idle or busy) based
on the most recent sensing results. When there are high-
priority users, the IoT transmitter with lower priority employs
a backoff mechanism to avoid its interference to high-priority
user transmissions. We showed that deep learning can achieve
near-optimal throughput. We then studied adversarial machine
learning applied to this setting by applying exploratory, eva-
sion and causative attacks to jamming, spectrum poisoning
and priority violation attacks The adversary first applies ex-
ploratory attack to predict the outcome (ACK or not) of
transmitter’s decisions. Then the adversary either changes the
test data (evasion attack) or the data in the retraining process
(causative attack) to reduce the IoT transmitter’s performance.
Our results demonstrate new ways to attack IoT systems with
adversarial machine learning applied as jamming, spectrum
poisoning and priority violation attacks, and report major
performance loss in IoT systems. Finally, we designed a
defense approach based on Stackelberg game and showed its
effectiveness in improving the transmitter’s performance.
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